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After weeks of procrastinating, here is the NATO paper. Now, for my attempt at an abstract:
NATO is currently facing two main challenges. First, the organization lacks a coherent vision of the future and its role. In order to make the Alliance more effective, I propose that NATO structure be fundamentally changed to adapt to Europe's new security environment. In short, European countries should quit trying to have comprehensive military forces and focus on a few spheres in which to modernize. These various specialites would be coordinated with the needs of the Alliance in mind.
Second, some leaders in Europe are trying to shift European defense over to the European Union. This has extremely damaging, and potentially catastrophic consequences for the Transatlantic Alliance, which will only lead to a weakening of the power of both.
Lastly, I give a cursory examination of several current issues of note, including: Israel, Iran, Afghanistan, and Russia.
So please, read away:
You can download the word document here.
And if you want to comment, I've set up a board to replace the broken comments.
Owen Paun
May 11, 2005
St. Petersburg, Russia
NATO: Internal and External Challenges
Introduction
Founded in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was Western Europe's answer to a security crisis posed by the Soviet Union. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Western Europe was demolished, economically and militarily. Having advanced from Russia to Germany, the Soviet Union had a formidable military presence on the borders of Western Europe. Fearing aggressive invasion, and having no real means to fend it off, Western Europe answered by declaring that an attack on any individual country in the alliance was an attack on all. They formalized a mutual defense pact in order to use the United States' military power as a counterbalance to that of the Soviet Union.
The Alliance held firm at first out of sheer necessity, but over the years, the shared values and institutions of the West bonded the member nations into an even tighter group than had existed at the beginning. Over the next forty years, the Alliance held together, and saw the end of the conflict that had necessitated its creation. The main exception being French withdrawal from participation, which was the result of the seminal Gaullist desire to be a world leader on its own, a position that continues to create friction in the Alliance to this day.
When the Soviet Union fell apart, many felt that NATO should go with it, that its primary role was no longer relevant. These arguments continued through the nineties, and took on a slightly different character during the debates over enlargement. Eventually, enlargement was chosen as a means to secure democracy and give the ex-Soviet satellite states increased integration into the West.
The first time the Alliance was ever actually used was after its original enemy was gone. Instead, it acted outside of its borders and intervened in the Balkans. This was the “point of no return.” NATO had officially shifted from being a mutual defense pact into an organization that would act outside of its territory in an attempt to stave off potential threats to the security of its members.
In the years since this first shift, NATO has undergone a second questioning of its purpose, and it currently faces two main challenges. First and foremost, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization needs to decide, once and for all, what its new role in the world is to be, when and where should it intervene. Beyond that, however, NATO faces a threat from the increasing integration of the European Union and the possibility that it will become obsolete in favor of an institution of European, and not Transatlantic, defense.
It is worth noting that the two main threats that face NATO are both internal. There is no conventional force that poses any real threat to the Alliance at this point in time. Instead, NATO faces a crisis of mission. What is it supposed to do, when, and where? Beyond this structural concern, there is also the danger that the group of allies who were bound together in the face of a common enemy may be drifting apart.
Mission and Structure
Threats
NATO's prima facie mission is to provide for the security of its members. Under this definition, however, it is difficult to explain its use in Kosovo or Afghanistan. Both of these examples point to a changing “raison d'etre” for the organization.
Publicly, it was argued that the violence in the Balkans was likely to “spillover” into neighboring states, thus threatening the regional stability of Southeastern Europe. This was portrayed as such a substantial risk to Europe that it justified NATO's intervention. This official explanation obscures the fact that it was largely a response to cries for “humanitarian intervention,” to stem off the scale of violence that we saw in Bosnia and Croatia.
In such a situation as humanitarian intervention, a more logical actor would seem to be the United Nations. This avenue was impossible because Russia was opposed to any action, and would have vetoed a Security Council resolution. The result was that the only organization with the capability to intervene was NATO. This practical question forced a reexamination of NATO's role in the post-Cold War world.
From Kosovo on, it became well accepted that NATO could conduct “out of area” deployments to foster stability, and subsequently so acted in places like Macedonia. The next major use of NATO was as a replacement for US troops in Afghanistan. Again we are faced with the question of what possible security threat Afghanistan poses to the members of NATO. It certainly poses no conventional threat, it is too far away, disorganized, and impoverished. Failed states are dangerous mostly because they can act as incubators for terrorism, as Afghanistan did. While international terrorism is indeed the major threat to world stability, it is not specifically aimed at the member states of NATO. The warriors of Islamic jihad are just as happy to operate in Russia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the greater Middle East as they are the West.
Since the threat posed is truly global, why should NATO take the burden? Again, why not act through the United Nations? The answer is twofold. First, no other organization has the ability to act as efficiently and as far away as NATO. Second, there is a lack of political will in most of the world to undertake these operations because they erroneously see the threat of terrorism as directed primarily against the West, and not at them.
This deployment to Afghanistan has definitively shifted NATO's orientation from internal defense to external security. What remains to be done is to formulate a new mission statement, a new guiding philosophy. We need to develop at least a general idea of what constitutes a threat that NATO should address, and what actions lie in its field of responsibility. So far, we seem to be picking as we go, which leaves the organization open to the charge that it is nothing more than a tool for the self-interested actions of the West. Why, some would ask, do we not intervene in the Sudan, or Chechnya? Both are examples of humanitarian crises with the potential to become havens for international terrorists. I would contend that there are very good reasons to stay out of those conflicts, but until we have a comprehensive statement on NATO's new purpose, we are open to charges of hypocrisy. The primary danger of this charge is that it decreases the legitimacy of our operations, making them more costly politically and justifying armed opposition to them.
Additionally, these new out of area deployments are fundamentally different in character from the challenges of the Cold War. For forty years, the goal was to act as a deterrent to any aggressive action by the Soviet Union or its Warsaw Pact. The strategy called upon was to have large conventional forces sitting on the border. The emphasis was on quantity, usually achieved through minimally trained and armed conscripts.
Interoperability has always been a strategic goal of NATO, but in this scenario it was not very important. Essentially, the Allies would coordinate their armed forces to create a coherent battle plan, but each country would, in effect, be in control of its own, independent forces, in geographically self-contained areas.
After the end of the Cold War, the maintenance of such large scale forces was costly and unnecessary, especially considering that the entire Warsaw Pact was absorbed into NATO. As a result, countries started to abandon conscription and decrease their military forces, cashing in on the “peace dividend.”
Simply put, the old force structure is inadequate to deal with the new missions. We do not have enough mobile troops or the lift capability to take them thousands of kilometers away from their country of origin. And the minimal training that a conscript receives is grossly deficient in preparing for the types of delicate missions that are likely to be undertaken.
Solutions
It may seem self-evident, but it is important to recognize that NATO is a military organization. While capable of activities beyond combat, war remains its primary purpose. It is with this fundamental fact in mind that we should approach the formulation of a new strategic doctrine.
Under the guise of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping, NATO is involved in civil policing, construction, aid distribution, and myriad other non-combat activities. Some even call for expansion into other areas such as counterterrorism and disrupting the traffic of drugs and people. Though noble goals, these are not suited to military forces.
As a whole, NATO contains the world's most modern fighting forces, and they are capable of high-intensity combat operations. [Lithuanian Minister] NATO should be used when an armed crisis begins that either directly threatens a member state, or that is truly outrageous in terms of human rights violations. NATO's mission is to stop the fighting.
Recently, the focus has been on providing stability, or peacekeeping. This emphasis is misplaced, as most discussions of stability favor the status quo as it was before the conflict started, without taking into consideration that there may be very real underlying problems. Obviously the previous situation was untenable, or fighting would not have broken out. We seem to think that if we put in some soldiers, the two (or more) sides will see the error of their ways, sit down at a table, and agree to be peaceful. They do not. This results in extended armistices which do little to ease tensions between groups, and forces our troops to stay for years. Kosovo is still in a legal limbo close to a decade after NATO's intervention. While that may be preferable to the fighting, it is certainly no great success, and masks the fact that were our troops to leave the violence would resume.i
Instead of “stabilization,” the key word should be “transition.”ii Often, this will mean taking sides in the issue, and not acting as a neutral force. We should not pretend that both sides have equally valid claims, or equivalent culpability, though this may sometimes be the case. The first priority is to stop the bloodshed, but we must then work intensely to assure that such violence does not resume as soon as we leave.
To most effectively do this, NATO needs post-combat partners. Soldiers are not trained to build houses, construction workers are, they are not trained to police a civil population, law enforcement officers are, ad infinitum. NATO can provide a relatively secure environment in which these other organizations can go about their work on the civil society. The role of NATO forces outside of direct combat should be limited to tasks directly in line with their training. Some examples are high-risk acquisitions of war criminals, mine clearing, and the logistical transfer of humanitarian aid.
Unfortunately, at this time, there is a severe lack of professionals services in these fields, and the UN and EU should develop their competences in these spheres in order to best work with NATO. The answer is not to turn soldiers into police officers, construction workers, and psychological counselors, but to provide the atmosphere in which these people can come and safely perform their jobs.
In order to best intervene quickly, timely, and decisively in crisis situations, NATO must undergo a fundamental transformation of the way in which it makes decisions and how its forces are structured. It has already taken several steps in the right direction, but much still needs to be done.
Thus far, the reforms have focused on two projects. Prior to the creation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), action undertaken by NATO was all or nothing. Either every member of the Alliance went in together, or nobody did. With the CJTF, nations are allowed to abstain from action if they feel it is not in their national interest, without stopping other nations from joining together and acting. This procedural step allows a wider range of action than before. Furthermore, there has been work to create a NATO Response Force, which would act as a quick first wave in case of a crisis which could secure an area and set up for the main deployment.
To best undertake its new mission, the military forces of NATO need to move away from the large, minimally trained conscripts of the Cold War, and towards a slimmed down, highly equipped, professional army. The goal is to be able to project as much force, with as few resources, as quickly as possible. This means developing next generation weapons capabilities and investing in the sea and airlift capabilities necessary to move its forces out of area.
The most radical and necessary change has yet to be addressed. The military budget of the United States is $400 billion per year, compared with $200 billion for all the other NATO countries combined. Full scale modernization is not possible for most members of the Alliance. The more hi-tech the equipment, the more expensive it is to purchase and maintain. Faced with a cost that doubles every 15 to 20 years, smaller countries like Norway, Denmark, the Baltic states, etc., simply cannot maintain a national military force that covers the whole spectrum of capabilities.iii
The answer lies in the fact that the Alliance is not just a collection of nation-states that agree to coordinate in times of crisis, it is a permanent, integrated organization. Individual states should specialize in their contributions and not attempt to maintain a full force. We've already seen particular specializations, like the multinational chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense battalion, led by the Czech Republic.
This multinational integration, while a step forward, does not deal with the fundamental difficulties of fielding a fully operational structure. Instead of creating mixed groups, each country should pick certain areas and focus on them, to the exclusion of others. We already have a model of this in Denmark, which chose to completely disband its submarine and Ground Based Air Defense forces. Rededicating these resources elsewhere has allowed them to double their deployable troops from 1,000 to 2,000. In addition, any Danish deployment contains all the logistics and support units necessary to sustain itself.iv
The geopolitical situation of Europe has changed so much that weapons systems integral to the defense of one's territory, such as air defense, can be phased out in favor of creating a more effective and usable NATO force. I would recommend that the Allied Command for Transformation set forth a strategic plan for national specialization taking into account such factors as infrastructure, historical experience, and physical location. A cursory examination would seem to suggest myriad fields of contribution such as coast guard, air superiority, extreme conditions (desert/mountain/tundra/jungle/etc.), hostage rescue, NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical), special forces, policing, military and civil police training, land mine disposal, and the list goes on.
The only real problem with setting up such a structure is cost-sharing. Without a doubt, some of these specialties would be called upon more often than others. If asked to constantly to bear the costs of deployment, most countries would become less and less anxious to participate. Some sort of communal funding needs to be established, which is no easy task.
The connections of history, economics, and values bind the Alliance together, but it is the guarantee of Article V, that an attack on one is an attack on all, that creates the atmosphere in which such a radical change can take place. In our zeal to transform, we must not forget that this is the basis, and the most sacred obligation, of the Alliance.
Recent historical experience has taught the Baltic states not to trust their Eastern neighbor, and they would be hesitant to change their force structure or contribute troops out of country were it not for their complete confidence in the backing of the Alliance. In the same vein, Denmark can get rid of its air defense capabilities because they know that any conceivable attacking force would likely have to cross over several other NATO members before arriving in Copenhagen, and would hopefully have been dealt with en route.
In the debates on enlargement, it was often argued that the new member countries had obsolete militaries that would add nothing to the Alliance, while at the same time provoking the Russian public into electing a hard-line administration. The fears about Russian reaction have proven unfounded, and through specialization, the new member are able to contribute at least as much as the older members. Considering that these states have to buy everything from scratch, their contributions may be far more advanced than those of their Western allies. In this respect, the enlargement has turned out to be an astounding success.
Transatlantic or European Focus?
Just as NATO is facing a critical questions about its role in the world and how to best undertake it, the political climate of the Transatlantic alliance is in one of its most uncertain phases ever. Some in the alliance are paving the way for a transfer of European defense to the European Union, and recent actions have shown the reticence of many members in engaging in action.
At the Munich Security Conference, Chancellor Schroder stated that NATO is “no longer the primary venue where trans-Atlantic partners consult on and coordinate strategic ideas.”v There are two interpretations of this statement. The first, initial sentiment was that that Schroeder, along with France and a couple others, want to move away from NATO and towards a more integrated European Union security force, hence the discussions would take place at a different building in Brussels. The second interpretation was issued after diplomatic outcry against his comment, and says that Schroeder was pointing out a lack of communication in NATO, which he wishes were restored to its proper role within the Alliance.
Recent events would support the initial interpretation over the diplomatic reevaluation. The new European Union Constitution, currently facing unsure ratification, would create a unified foreign policy, even establishing a minister of foreign affairs.vi Considering the diversity of viewpoints in the EU, and the essential lack of any direct democratic participation in the creation of EU policy, this has the very real potential to marginalize any views dissenting from the Franco-German axis whose goal is to create a counter balance to American power. President Jacques Chricac openly stated as much when he said that voting against the constitution would benefit the United States.vii At this present time, there is no greater threat to the Transatlantic Alliance than this power struggle.
It is not going to happen overnight, but with the adoption of this constitution, and the political inclination of Paris and Berlin, the groundwork will have been laid. There is an inherent tension in the constitution between national autonomy and subservience to the majority.viii Article I-16(1) implies that individual nation states will retain their veto over matters of foreign and security policy only for a short time, calling for the “progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.” And the continuation of this article exhorts its members to “actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security policy” and “refrain from actions contrary to the Union's interests or likely to impair its effectiveness.” Thus, states would not be allowed to differ from the stated policy, and any attempt at national independence would be unconstitutional.
If all actions are undertaken unanimously, then this last section is superfluous, in a document that already stretches to almost 500 pages. Either actions are taken by all, in which case everyone agrees, or they are not, in which case there is no common policy. Any written reference to enforced unanimity could only come into play when there is disagreement, so this language is included in order to enter into effect at a later date, as the European Court of Justice increases the areas of integration, in accordance with the stated purpose to achieve “an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions.” (Article I-40)
We are to believe that the second text is included as flowery language, not to imply that nations will be coerced into submission. Those who believe in further deepening will say whatever necessary in order to persuade skeptical populations to adopt the constitution. From that point on, it does not matter what they said in public, and all constitutional rulings will refer to the text, where it clearly states that individual members will have to follow the central position. For another recent example of this diplomatic doublespeak, look to Chancellor Schroeder's statement that “lifting the weapons embargo [on China] is not designed to boost arms sales to China.”ix
Any sort of forced unanimity would silence numerous voices in the EU and lead to a vast reduction in actions taken by NATO, the US would not want to act without partners, and the EU would be incapable of acting without the US. Even without the institutional backing of the constitution, Chirac attempted to coerce the new EU entrants from joining the US-led coalition in Iraq, effectively threatening their future membership. The 12 member states who participated in the coalition in would have been prevented from doing so had such a system been in place.
The solution to this problem is to make it abundantly clear that NATO is the only place where the security discussion takes place. If any would like to pursue an EU path, they should not have the power to coerce others into joining. This would effectively result in a “Europe at multiple speeds.”
What then will become of the countries who decided to forgo NATO for an EU force? Simply put, they will be engaging in a fantasy of autonomy while remaining weak, disorganized, incapable of action, and protected by NATO. In the end, it is unlikely that France or Germany would wish to break permanently from NATO if others decided to stay, doing so would remove their voice from the only security institution that actually counts. Their exclusive option is an all or nothing shift in defense policy towards the EU, which would be, de facto, under Franco-German dominance.
Keeping the focus on NATO, instead of trying to build a common foreign and security policy in the EU will have benefits for both sides of the Atlantic. The force structure would continue to be unified, and the Europe would be protected by the strongest alliance in world history, while at the same time allowing for free national expression.
Interestingly, the force structure specialization that I spoke of earlier can play an important part in dealing with this current crisis. In any sort of NATO reorganization, the base will remain the United States. By reshaping their national military forces in the context of the Alliance, member states would be commiting themselves to NATO for the foreseeable future. It would be difficult to break apart and form a European defense because the support of the US would not be there, and the states would have to realign their forces once again. This step alone will act as a significant deterrent against any separatist ambitions.
Beyond that, the EU should focus on creating the sort of civilian reconstruction teams that could be a perfect partner in NATO actions, the kind I called for earlier. Instead of trying to provide hard security, such a shift in EU policy could complement the Alliance, thereby creating a synthesis of the two organizations that would increase exponentially the usefulness of both.
Current Issues
In any discussion of the threats to NATO, it is important to note current areas where the Alliance could play a role. The most obvious is Iraq. Already, many member states of NATO are involved in the US-led coalition, but the organization itself has no official presence, mainly due to the extreme political opposition of several members. The current NATO role is limited to some training of Iraqis in Jordan.
Whatever ones political feelings on the legitimacy of the war in Iraq, from an operational point of view, this conflict was one well suited to an integrated NATO structure. From a military perspective, the United States went alone in Afghanistan (and largely Iraq) because working with NATO is seen as too ineffective. At this point in time, it is much easier for the US to command all the operations than to use an uncoordinated NATO. The new structure would have allowed much greater control and communication between the various member states involved in the invasion.
As it stands now, everyone agrees that Iraq must have a stable government, anything less would create an even worse situation than under Saddam. NATO could play a valuable role here by increasing the legitimacy of the troops on the ground, thereby reducing the effectiveness of calls to “oust the imperialist invader.”
From political statements, nobody wants a nuclear Iran, not its neighbors, not the Europeans, and not America. Disarmament negotiations, however, seem to have no effect, and Iran continues with its nuclear program. The main reason why negotiations are ineffective is because they are not backed up by force, the Europeans have publicly said that a military strike is not an option. If the worst that Iran faces is economic sanctions, then there is little to persuade them to stop their weapons development. Iran's primary export is oil, and no one wants them to stop producing it, so they are almost immune from sanctions. Tehran faces no serious consequences to further armament, and is using the talks to buy time while it completes its nuclear enrichment.
The only way for negotiations to be effective is to have all sides united in pressuring Iran, and to have that pressure backed up by the threat of violence. In this aspect, Russia could be a very important ally of the United States. If Russia and NATO coordinated and let Iran know how strongly they feel about this, it would persuade the Iranians to sit down at the table for real. While pressing for a peaceful solution, NATO and Russia should stand in solidarity that any agreement will be backed by force. Without the threat of violence, America and the Europeans have nothing with which to persuade Iran, except money, which has been notoriously ineffective in past disarmament negotiations.
The Israel-Palestinian question looms large as one of the most pressing of all global issues.. Some people have proposed using NATO troops as peacekeepers to enforce any treaty concluded between the two sides. Unfortunately, that presupposes a peace treaty that is not likely to happen anytime in the near future. That is not to say that NATO does not have a role in Mid-East peace. Indeed, I think that the Alliance could play an instrumental part.
Isreal has two primary concerns when it comes to turning over control of the Palestinian territories. First, they feel that they do not have anyone to turn it over to. To many, Yassir Arafat was a terrorist with little ability or desire to control the terrorist groups operating in his midst. With the death of Arafat and the emergence of Mahmoud Abbas as the new leader, there is hope that finally Israel has a negotiating partner. Second, Israel is afraid that the territories will be used either as a safe haven for terrorist groups whose goal is the complete destruction of Israel, or as a staging point for invading Arab armies. Since the territories have been used for both of these actions in the past, the fears are well founded.
Whereas the first concern is being addressed by Abbas, the second concern could be alleviated by NATO through an offer of membership. Were Israel a full member, it would be covered by the Article V guarantee of protection in the case of an attack. This guarantee would cover its fears about any aggressive actions by its neighbors, and could give Israel the psychological reassurance it needs in order to cede the land to the Palestinians. Moreover, NATO could benefit from Israel's extensive experience in counter-insurgency operations.
Until this point, most of the debate about NATO centered on who should be a member. Membership has expanded Eastward, into the ex-Soviet bloc, and even contains former republics of the Soviet Union. During each of these debates the main fear was that the expansion would anger Russia. Angry or not, Russia had no say in the matter, being too weak and unorganized. While still no challenge to the Alliance, that situation has changed.
Russia continues to improve economically and politically. The old divisions of Europe need to change. Russia is very much a part of the solution to the new problems of European security, namely regional conflict and terrorism. While the possibility of full Russian membership in NATO is still not in the foreseeable future, there are steps that can be taken to strengthen the relationship between the two.
As Russia's economy develops even further, it will have the capability to field a full military force, unlike most other countries in Europe. This could eventually serve as a second base to the specializing countries, taking some of the strain off of America in any joint NATO-Russian deployments. In order to effectively play this role, as Russia modernizes, it would be wise to develop systems that are NATO compatible.
Additionally, in the current environment, NATO and Russia need to increase cooperation in both military and non-military spheres. Afghanistan, which currently has both NATO and Russian troops, could serve as an experiment in the strengths and weaknesses of military cooperation between the two. And the War on Terrorism would benefit greatly from greater coordination of information and action.
Conclusion
At a little over half a century old, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is having a mid-life crisis. The world has changed fundamentally, and so must the Alliance. In large part, it has taken the correct steps thus far, admitting into its heart its former enemies. These new countries now have the opportunity to lead the Alliance into the next century as they modernize and specialize their military forces. This radical restructuring will make NATO a stronger and more effective force in world affairs.
Certain members of Europe desire to shift away from NATO and establish a European defense organization through the European Union. Doing so would increase their relative power over the other members of the EU, and allow them to act as a counterbalance to the United States. Such a move, however, would only weaken both sides of the Atlantic. We must make it clear that the Alliance is the common guarantor of Transatlantic security, while using the EU to create complementary institutions to secure the peace after NATO has stopped the fighting.
From Iraq to Afghanistan, and from Kosovo to the next flash point, NATO has an important role to play to help make the world a safer, more secure place. A role that can be greatly improved by strengthening relations and cooperation with Russia.
Posted by Owen at May 13, 2005 01:06 AM | TrackBack